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1 The outbreak of war between the Soviet Union and the Nazi Germany affected Soviet
society in multiple ways, one of which concerned popular opinion about the nature and
efficiency of the Soviet regime. Court statistics from 1941-1942 recorded a distinct rise in
the number of counter-revolutionary crimes committed after June 22, 1941. In particular,
this increase involved politically unacceptable speech qualified according to Article 58.10
of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR as “counter-revolutionary agitation and propaganda.”
By examining surveys of the legal prosecution of this crime, which the Supreme Court of
the USSR produced in 1941-1942, I want to answer three questions: How did the Soviet
legal  system operate  as  an  instrument  of  establishing  and  supporting  socio-political
hierarchies?  How did the War change the judiciary’s  approach to  perceived political
dissent? Finally, what were the implications of this change on the relationship between
the ruling regime and the Soviet population?
2 These questions have escaped previous research. Peter Solomon’s groundbreaking and
meticulously researched monograph on the history of Stalinist criminal justice omits the
war period altogether.2 An article by Sarah Davies, devoted to the prosecution of counter-
revolutionary propaganda and agitation, ends in 1939.3 Such chronological choices imply
that the War was a turning point in the history of  Soviet  popular opinion and legal
political  repression.  Yet  the  nature  and  the  scope  of  the  implied  change  remain
unexplored.
3 According to judicial practice reviews conducted by the Supreme Court, there was little
difference in the content of speech prosecuted as counter-revolutionary agitation during
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the war compared to the prewar period. As in the 1930s, Soviet citizens expressed their
dissatisfaction  with  various  social  and  economic  policies,  complained  about living
standards,  distrusted  claims  of  the  official  press,  and  spoke  irreverently  about  the
behavior and personal qualities of state leaders.4 Naturally, the War introduced some new
themes. Many people felt the need to rationalize the Red Army’s initial defeats and found
explanations in recent Soviet history. One such popular interpretation contended that
the NKVD had eliminated the best military commanders during the Great Terror. Another
explanation blamed prewar Soviet economic policies (first of all, the collectivization of
agriculture) for destroying the country’s economy and,  along with that,  undermining
popular loyalty.5 Overall, however, the War not so much changed the content of critical
expressions as gave the population numerous new pretexts to engage in criticism of the
regime. Even under the assumption that the nature of  judiciary reviews as historical
sources precludes us from making any claims about actual popular moods, and that these
reviews  reflect  only  official  categories  imposed  on  diverse  individual  opinions,  it  is
nonetheless significant that officials continued to rely on legal categories used before the
War and did not revise them to reflect any qualitative changes.6
4 It was the quantity, not the quality of “counter-revolutionary agitation” that changed,
and  quantity  mattered.  Since  the  prosecution  of  all  counter-revolutionary  crimes,
covered by Article 58 in general, was implemented by many legal and extra-legal agencies
(regular courts, railway courts, military tribunals, and, to a large extent, the NKVD), an
attempt  to  summarize  the  effect  of  the  War’s  outbreak  in  concrete  numbers  is  a
challenging  task.7 Statistics  on  the  NKVD,  presented  in  Table  1,  show that  both  the
absolute number of Article 58.10 cases, and their proportion to all counter-revolutionary
crimes rose in 1941, peaked in 1942, and rapidly declined starting with 1943.
 
Table 1. Number of convictions for counter-revolutionary crimes by the NKVD in 1939-19478
5 Respective comprehensive statistics for the judiciary are unavailable to me, but reviews
of court practice from the early war years confirm a dramatic rise both in the absolute
and relative numbers of counter-revolutionary agitation cases in 1941-1942. For example,
in April of 1941, the Gorky oblast court processed only 30 cases of counter-revolutionary
crimes, including agitation. In May the number amounted to 28, but already in June it
rose to 39, and soared in July to 171 cases. In the first 15 days of August 1941, 104 new
cases were opened. Counterrevolutionary agitation made up over 80% of this rapid and
marked surge.9
6 This increase notwithstanding, in the Soviet Union as a whole, the early years of the War
did not break the record of convictions for counter-revolutionary agitation established
during the Great Terror. In 1937, the NKVD alone convicted 234,301 people for this crime.
10 On the other hand, as Table 2 demonstrates, even in the crisis year of 1942 the total
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number of  convictions  for  all  counter-revolutionary  crimes,  including  sabotage,
terrorism and so forth, was 279,651. Considering that in 1942 only about half of all NKVD
Article 58 convictions dealt with agitation and propaganda, it is highly unlikely that the
total number of Article 58.10 convictions exceeded the 1937 level. Moreover, the number
of  people  convicted  during  the  War  for  other  types  of  crimes  indicates  that  the
prosecution of  counter-revolutionary propaganda was not  a  primary concern for  the
Soviet  system of  justice.  While  the  total  number  of  persons  convicted  by  courts  in
1941-1945 for work discipline violations, according to the notorious Decree of June 26,
1940,  exceeds  7,000,000,11 the  corresponding number of  counter-revolutionary crimes
convictions only reached 500,908, a mere 1/14th of the former number.
7 Why, then, is the study of legal prosecution during the War important? For one,  the
number  of  counter-revolutionary  convictions  in  1941-1942  dramatically  increased
compared to 1939-1940, indicating a new turn in how the Soviet government approached
public  opinion.  Second,  if  we compare the total  number of  convictions in the whole
category of counter-revolutionary crimes on the basis of published statistics from the
wartime and the immediate pre- and post-war years (Table 2),  we notice not only an
overall increase in the number of cases starting in 1941, but also a sustained growth in
the use of legal prosecution as opposed to extralegal (NKVD) repression. It was during the
War that fortunes in a decades-long competition between legal and extralegal organs for
the authority to implement Soviet laws12 slowly, but, in the final outcome, irreversibly
changed  in  favor  of  the  former.  In  1941,  the  part  of  counter-revolutionary  crimes
prosecuted through courts began to exceed that of the NKVD trials.
8 This  proportional  change  had  important  implications.  Even  though  both  extralegal
repressive organs and the courts acted within the same framework of criminal legislation,
on the procedural level their practices were very different. NKVD trials were conducted
swiftly behind closed doors, while judicial proceedings, at least in theory, had to conform
to the rules of “socialist legality.” Witnesses were called to testify in court, the accused
had a right  to a  defense attorney,  and trials  ended with public  verdicts.  Even if  the
functioning of the legal system was not supposed to be completely transparent to laymen
(as numerous Supreme Court  secret  instructions for judges indicate),  these relatively
open and formalized court proceedings inevitably disseminated knowledge of Soviet legal
norms among the broader public.
 
Table 2. The number of convictions for counter-revolutionary crimes by the NKVD and Soviet courts
of all categories, 1939-194713
9 This increasingly prominent role of the courts in the prosecution of political crimes after
1941  makes  it  especially  important  to  establish  the  motivations  behind  Soviet  legal
policies and to analyze how court officials understood socialist legality at the time.
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10 In order to assess possible wartime changes in this respect, it is first necessary to look at
the general logic of Soviet legal policies regarding counter-revolutionary agitation. While
the criminalization of alternative political opinions under Stalin is common historical
knowledge,  legal  functionaries’  approach  to  this  form  of  political  prosecution  has
received little attention from historians. The animated controversy over the nature of
popular opinion in Stalinist society that has taken place in the past fifteen years has done
little to explain why, in what manner, and to what purpose the state prosecuted people
that allegedly expressed anti-Soviet sentiments.14 Since most scholars approach outlawed
speech “from below,” in an attempt to discern the authentic political views of the Soviet
population, they tend to ignore the institutional perspective. For those historians who,
through the study of popular opinion, seek to demonstrate popular resistance against the
Bolshevik regime, the reason why the regime wanted to suppress such resistance is self-
evident.15 For those scholars who, on the contrary, believe that popular opinion, even of
an apparently dissenting kind,  should not be interpreted as the citizens’  rejection of
Soviet  rule  and  even  demonstrates  their  identification  with  the  dominant  political
discourse, the issue of prosecution is irrelevant.16
11 The only work that focuses on the legal prosecution of anti-Soviet agitation, the article by
Sarah Davies,  analyzes it  predominately in quantitative,  not qualitative terms.  Davies
describes how the prosecution of politically subversive speech fluctuated, in her own
words,  “from  extreme  to  moderation,”  with  periods  characterized  by  the  varying
participation of legal and extra-legal agencies, and by alternations between the Bolshevik
principle of class favoritism and the legal doctrine of individual responsibility.17 However,
she does not question the ultimate objectives of repressive policies and considers them
solely  as  an  instrument  in  suppressing  dissent.  Such  an  approach  is,  ultimately,
reductionist,  because  it  portrays  law  as  a  reaction  to  an  already  present  social
phenomenon (dissent) and disregards its constructive nature. In fact, Article 58.10, like
any other law, did not merely enforce the social norm by punishing the crime. Instead, it
created the norm by drawing the divide between accepted and unaccepted behavior.
12 From  a  constructivist  perspective,  the  object  of  legal  repression  is  not  individual
offenders but society at large. As Peter Holquist argues in his pioneering essay, state
violence in the Bolshevik political  system, to a significant extent,  had a prophylactic
character,  and  aimed  at  molding  the  population’s  structure  along  desired  lines.18
Although Holquist  deals  largely with extra-legal  political  repression,  implemented by
security organs, his argument can be extended to legal prosecution as well. By analyzing
the objectives  of  the  prosecution  of  political  crimes  via  the  court  system,  we  can,
therefore, refine our understanding of how Stalin’s regime managed different segments
of the Soviet population, and what kind of society was supposed to emerge as the result of
these endeavors.
13 But  how exactly,  and to  what  purposes,  did  the  Soviet  system of  justice  attempt  to
reshape society? Did this system, in Holquist’s words, aim at “molding society’s human
material into a more emancipated, conscious, and superior individual – the ‘new man’”?19
From my sources it is apparent that the judicial prosecution of counter-revolutionary
agitation during the war had much less ambitious goals. Its ultimate objective was to
preserve the status quo in the relationship between the population and the regime rather
than to transform the political consciousness of Soviet citizens.
14 To begin with, judicial prosecution of counter-revolutionary agitation was directed at
behavior, not thoughts. The law in question was not concerned with popular opinion per
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se,  let alone individual political views. Even though Article 58.10 was used de facto to
ensure  political  conformity,  the  law  on  counterrevolutionary  agitation  concerned
potential actions by the population at large, and not individual beliefs and opinions.20 The
very  emergence  and  continuity  of  this  legal  norm was  dictated  by  motives  of  state
security, which in their turn reflected the politics of total war. The notorious Article 58
emerged in February 1927, at the height of the Soviet war scare of 1926-1927, when all
counter-revolutionary crimes were consolidated into one article of a new criminal code.21
The timing of this legislative changes explicitly point out developments that the law on
counterrevolutionary  agitation  aimed  to  prevent:  mass  mobilization  for  the  enemy’s
cause, which could either provoke or assist foreign military intervention. As has been
persuasively argued in recent scholarship, the Great Terror itself, marked by the historic
peak of Article 58.10 convictions, was, to a large extent, motivated by a new war scare and
constituted an attempt to prevent the emergence of a “fifth column” that could rebel
against the Soviet government and contribute to its defeat.22 With Operation Barbarossa,
foreign  military  intervention  became  a  reality,  providing  the  law’s  rationale  with  a
resounding confirmation; at the same time, it became a serious test for the Soviet legal
system. For the first time since the end of the Civil War, this system had to ensure state
security while a war was being conducted on Soviet territory, and simultaneously observe
the requirements of socialist legality in the (relatively) public environment of the court.
15 Unlike  many  instances  of  Soviet  prewar  “campaign  justice,”  the  numerical  rise  in
counter-revolutionary  agitation cases  after  the  war’s  outbreak did  not  result  from a
governmental decree or legislative changes, which would direct Soviet courts’ attention
to  a  new perceived  source  of  social  danger.23 On the  contrary,  sources  unanimously
indicate that more intensive legal prosecution was a response to an actual change in
Soviet  popular opinion,  in its  turn,  provoked by the developments at  the front.  This
response, initially, was somewhat inconsistent at the local level and, in any case, not
orchestrated by higher authorities.  As the Supreme Court put it later, “not all  courts
immediately readjusted themselves to the new conditions” after the war’s outbreak, and
many judges were regrettably unable “to leave behind the peace-time mentality.”24 Thus,
at the same time as the number of people convicted for counter-revolutionary agitation
drastically rose, higher judiciary officials chastised lower courts for excessive leniency.25
16 Yet  the opposite  excess,  severe  terms of  punishment,  also  created serious  problems.
Within weeks after June 22, 1941, Soviet courts, even those far-removed from the front,
began to prosecute counter-revolutionary agitation according to Part 2 of Article 58.10
(instead of Part 1), which dealt with the conditions of wartime. As a result, the same
actions that,  before June 1941,  could lead to as little as six months of  imprisonment
(although the usual prison terms for this offense were longer, ranging between two and
ten years),26 now offenders faced the prospect of at least ten years of incarceration, or
death, unless mitigating circumstances were found (which, according to the letter of the
law, was impossible).27 The courts, inundated with counter-revolutionary cases, often did
not hesitate to pass summary justice, resulting in a high number of capital punishment
sentences.  For example,  from 2,229 people indicted in April-August 1942 for counter-
revolutionary agitation by Kazakh SSR courts, 82.1% were convicted to either ten years of
imprisonment or death, with an almost equal distribution between the two categories.
Since many of the convicts had close relatives fighting in the Red Army, excessive capital
sentences  and other  severe terms of  punishment were potentially  dangerous for  the
regime.28 How could the courts, then, navigate between these extremes and avoid the
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danger of either condoning the population’s disloyalty or provoking it with their own
actions?
17 As a response to the initial confusion at the local level, in 1942 the Supreme Court issued
a number of secret instructions to lower courts, ensuring that prosecution would extend
to  the  widest  possible  groups  of  offenders,  but  also  by  giving  the  courts  extensive
guidelines in order to reduce the number of controversial verdicts and expedite legal
proceedings. I base the further part of my article on one such lengthy document, dated
with June 1942. As this document persuasively demonstrates, to achieve this first goal,
the  Supreme  Court  redefined  one  of  the  basic  notions  of  legal  theory  –  subjective
culpability, and thereby extended the application of Article 58.10. Subjective culpability
in  Soviet  criminal  legislation,  like  in  other  modern legal  systems,  was  based on the
presumption that guilt depends not only on the person’s committing an actual criminal
deed, but on the presence or absence of a conscious intent to commit such a deed. This
presumption precludes judges from passing a verdict on the grounds of the action alone.
As regards counter-revolutionary agitation in particular,  according to the law, it  was
defined as a purposeful exertion of influence over the masses, in order to undermine
their loyalty to the Soviet regime. Yet, the Supreme Court admitted, in many cases such a
purpose was missing,  and anti-Soviet  expressions merely reflected the personal  anti-
Soviet sentiments of the speakers. Sometimes, no negative attitude to Soviet rule was
voiced at all, while the speaker criticized only particular governmental campaigns. Thus
the prosecuted activity  often did not  display the features  of  agitation.  However,  the
Supreme Court claimed, the application of Article 58.10 to such cases was completely
legitimate. It declared that, under the new political circumstances, criminal intent no
longer referred to the desire to overthrow Soviet rule, but concerned, instead, the very
act of anti-Soviet speech: “every person of sound mind [who expresses anti-Soviet views]
wants to make anti-Soviet expressions and predicts that his expression will bear an anti-
Soviet nature.”29
18 At the same time, the official approach to culpability in counter-revolutionary agitation
cases  displayed  a  remarkable  inconsistency.  On  the  one  hand,  a  conscious  intent  to
commit a criminal act was a necessary precondition of bearing full responsibility before
the law. On the other hand, active agency in counter-revolutionary agitation cases was
assigned to external  forces.  In  the first  post-revolutionary years,  the Supreme Court
explained,  anti-Soviet  agitation  had  consisted  in  open  calls  to  overthrow the  Soviet
regime. With the triumph of socialism, its enemies resorted instead to covert anti-Soviet
activities  and  had  been  trying  to  influence  less  conscious  and  politically  unstable
elements indirectly. On what grounds, then, should these passive tools be punished for
the actions that they did not really mean to commit? According to the Criminal Code, the
crime of counter-revolutionary agitation did not have circumstances that could reduce
culpability  and,  by  definition,  was  a  pre-meditated  act.  There  could  not  have  been
counter-revolutionary agitation committed in the heat of the moment or by carelessness.
Nevertheless,  the  Supreme  Court  insisted  that  offenders’  guilt  could  have  different
degrees, and strongly recommended that lower courts, when passing verdicts, take into
account the “personality” of the accused.
19 What did the “personality” mean in judicial  practice? According to historians of  the
Soviet system of justice, throughout the 1920s and 1930s, this system alternated between
an approach they describe as “class favoritism,” that is,  the preferential treatment of
criminals  with  a  working class  background,  and the  opposite  principle  of  individual
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responsibility,  whereby  only  the  elements  of  the  offense  (that  is,  action and intent)
determine the degree of punishment.30 My sources indicate that this juxtaposition of class
favoritism to individual responsibility does not always adequately describe the logic of
legal prosecution. According to the Supreme Court’s instructions,  class affiliation was
only important inasmuch as it allowed for evaluating subjective culpability.
20 In particular, the Supreme Court recommended that lower courts pay special attention to
whether  anti-Soviet  speech  followed  from a  systematic  world-view or  was  somehow
accidental to the culprit. In establishing this fact, judges ought not to rely on personal
confessions of  guilt  or declarations of  innocence.  Instead,  the courts were advised to
derive the connections between personal beliefs and public expressions from indirect
evidence: the suspects’ age, gender, education, criminal record, as well as their familial
ties and social background.
21 Instead of cultivating “class favoritism,” Soviet judges turned to the social origin of the
accused in order to establish his or her individual guilt. To determine the degree of guilt
and quantify  the  social  danger  posed by the  accused,  social  knowledge was  utilized,
similar to what Peter Holquist has identified as the operative conceptual framework of
extra-legal political repression: certain social categories were seen as more potentially
dangerous than others.31 Besides class, other factors, such as age and gender, were seen as
no less significant. Why were these other factors so important? According to Bolshevik
doctrine, each social group was assigned a fixed political worldview. Consequently, the
working classes could not harbor genuine anti-Soviet sentiments.  The fact that many
workers and peasants did engage in criticism of the regime was explained by personal
characteristics  that  prevented  the  offenders  from  fully  realizing  their  class
consciousness.
22 The age of convicts is the issue most often discussed in a report concerning judicial errors
and unjustifiably severe sentences. In numerous cases, persons condemned to death for
counter-revolutionary agitation were already in their 70s and 80s, hence the Supreme
Court stated that their sentences were not only unnecessary severe,  but also did not
reflect the nature of the crime correctly. Anti-Soviet expressions, in these cases, allegedly
did not follow from a developed ideological conviction, but were to a significant extent
the result of illiteracy, cultural backwardness of people unable, often in view of their
advanced age, to combat, in their consciousness, the survivals of capitalism, under the
influence of which they had lived a greater part of their lives.32
23 Gender  was  also  considered  a  significant  factor  in  determining  culpability.  Peasant
women,  in  particular,  allegedly  tended  to  indulge  in  anti-Soviet  speech  not  out  of
ideological conviction, but in connection to the difficulties of everyday life, and their
expressions were often not a result of systematic political views, but were produced by
their “cultural and political backwardness.”33 Women, especially of older age and lower
educational background, were also perceived as excessively emotional and irrational, and
therefore the Supreme Court advised not taking their words literally in every case.34
24 Personal histories of the convicts were another important factor for deciding a sentence.
The 1942 report mentions a disproportionate percentage of “persons compromised in the
past or present” among those convicted for anti-Soviet agitation (115 out of the total 200
cases,  surveyed by the Supreme Court  in November 1941-March 1942,  or  58%).35 The
official interpretation of this fact – that the people marginalized by the regime tended to
dislike it – is reasonable, but cannot fully explain this high percentage and should be
complemented  with  the  assumption  that  people  discredited  by  their  past  were
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particularly prone to be denounced and convicted. Indeed, a past criminal record could
play a fateful role, as demonstrated by a case of a lower court’s incompetence, which
concerned a man who had been previously convicted to seven years imprisonment for
anti-Soviet agitation, but received only a five year sentence for a repeated crime in the
same category – an unacceptable act of leniency in the eyes of the Supreme Court.36 The
nature  of  offense  itself  was  irrelevant  compared  to  the  very  fact  of  the  previous
conviction, which, in its turn, supposedly indicated the convict’s consistent anti-Soviet
attitude.
25 The  issue  of  “personality”  was  not  limited  to  the  characteristics  of  the  individuals
brought before the court, and extended to their social networks, first of all, family. The
relatives of the “former” people,  kulaks, and other alienated social elements were an
object  of  special  attention.  As  the  case  of  the  engineer  Turchin  demonstrates,  the
presence or absence of such a relationship could become a matter of life or death. In
August  1941,  Turchin  was  sentenced  by  the  Gorki  oblast  court  to  ten  years  of
imprisonment and five years of disenfranchisement for the crime of anti-Soviet agitation.
The Chief Prosecutor of the RSFSR protested that the sentence was insufficiently severe,
pointing out that Turchin’s father had been a large real estate owner before 1917 and,
after the revolution, had been disenfranchised. A renewed criminal proceeding resulted
in a capital punishment sentence. The convict’s appeal to the Supreme Court of the RSFSR
was dismissed. However, the Supreme Court of the USSR discovered that both the initial
and revised sentences were based on false grounds:  documents contained in the case
proved that Turchin’s father had been disenfranchised by mistake, because the value of
his pre-revolutionary property was,  in fact,  relatively insignificant.  Consequently,  the
Supreme  Court  commuted  the  sentence  to  six  years  of  imprisonment  and  approved
Turchin’s  petition  to  be  sent  to  the  front,  suspending  his  sentence  for  the  time  of
hostilities.37
26 If even a familial relationship with a person alienated by the Soviet regime could turn
into an aggravating circumstance in the court, the issue of the culpability of such persons
themselves,  in practice,  sometimes was decided automatically.  Yet,  belying the “class
favoritism” theory, such instances were perceived as a violation of socialist legality. The
Supreme  Court’s  report  mentions,  as  an  example  of  unacceptable  negligence  and  a
formalistic approach, a case of a woman guilty of spreading panic but convicted not for
this relatively minor offense, but for the more serious crime of counter-revolutionary
agitation, only on the basis of the woman’s gentry origin.38
27 The persecution of particular social groups was not an ultimate goal of the Soviet legal
system. Instead, the Supreme Court emphasized the need to detect and eliminate sources
of socially dangerous ideas. The repetitiveness of the content of “anti-Soviet” speech, for
legal  organs,  could  not  have  possibly  come from repeated  observations  of  the  same
realities by many different individuals. Instead, the Supreme Court argued, it “suggests
that […] anti-Soviet expressions emerge not accidentally, and not in isolation from one
another, but perhaps are directed by masked enemies of the Soviet order or by direct
agents of Fascism.” Unfortunately, the document continues, “it should be noted that our
judiciary and investigative organs pay little attention to this aspect of the issue.”39
28 As an example of such negligence, the report quotes a case which combines many themes
mentioned above: age, gender, class, and adds to them ethnic bias. In early July 1941, a
certain Rigel´, a 20-year old female worker in a Baku textile factory, was heard talking
about the rapid advance of the enemy and, allegedly, claimed that the German Army was
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already  approaching  the  capital  of  Soviet  Azerbaijan.  To  make  matters  worse,  she
“expressed a positive attitude toward the leader of the Nazi state.” The investigation, the
report relates,  correctly assumed that the “underdeveloped young woman” could not
have been the author of such fabrications, and thus the possibility arose that she had
been  a  “tool  in  somebody’s  hands.”  Faced  with  questions  about  her  sources  of
information,  Rigel´  at  first  accused her  colleagues  at  the  factory,  but,  when pressed
further,  eventually declared that her father – an ethnic German – had incited her to
spread  the  rumors.  In  a  personal  confrontation  with  her  father,  she  changed  her
testimony once again, and, as a result, the father was interrogated for expressing anti-
Soviet views, but the charge of instigation against him was dropped. The Supreme Court
noted that this lower court, which did not bother to find the source of rumors and let a
probable instigator get away, was guilty of an improper lack of vigilance.40
29 As demonstrated in this example, official suspicions about the political loyalty of certain
ethnic groups affected the prosecution of counter-revolutionary agitation. Yet this case
also testifies to the continuing high importance of gender categories, even in the face of
ethnic scapegoating: the young female worker Rigel´, born to a German father, could have
been convicted as a politically alien element herself, but was excused due to her inferior
place in the network of gender and family relations.
30 While all the categories and approaches discussed above equally apply to the prosecution
of counter-revolutionary agitation in the 1930s, the war further slowed down the project
of social  transformation through law enforcement.  Even though subjective culpability
was seen as a crucial concept for implementing justice, overworked judges were advised
to determine this  culpability not so much on the basis  of  individual  behavior but of
general  social  categories  characterizing  the  accused.  Under  wartime  conditions,  the
Supreme Court placed a higher emphasis on age and gender in determining culpability
and  unwillingly  acknowledged  the  failure  of  20  years  of  Soviet  rule  to  reform  the
politically backward masses, whereas lower courts were besought, once again, not to look
for developed political consciousness among those social groups where it could not be
found. Thereby legal policy reaffirmed traditional class and gender hierarchies, with old
peasant women at the bottom, but a significant proportion of the Soviet population only
barely above them. Another aspect, with far-reaching implications for subsequent Soviet
history,  concerned  the  emergence  of  new  potentially  unreformable  population
categories, defined by ethnicity. Overall, an accelerated transformation of the political
worldview of large population strata was out the question for the judiciary.
31 There  was  another  consideration  that  further  reduced  the  urgency  of  socially
transformative policies during the war. Assigning the highest degree of responsibility for
anti-Soviet expressions to adult men, the regime portrayed this population category as
crucial for preserving the social order – an attitude that was reaffirmed in wartime. Old
people and women could be politically  “unstable” and personally  immature,  gullible,
emotional and irrational,  yet as long as fighting-age men remained loyal and bravely
fought in the Red Army, it did not matter so much what their mothers, fathers and wives
were thinking and saying. The regime did not hope to reshape these “ill-fit” categories
into “new men,” and preferred to keep the status quo, while simultaneously removing the
most dangerous individuals from society.
32 However,  the prosecution of counter-revolutionary agitation had another,  more long-
term and less direct effect on broader masses of the population. From indirect evidence it
becomes  clear  that  the  law  on  counter-revolutionary  agitation  was  also  seen  as  an
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instrument of inculcating official values, and not only through fear of punishment. The
courts were aware of citizens who tried to instrumentalize the law without adopting the
ideology it was supposed to foster. Thus the Supreme Court’s report warns that not all
testimony should be trusted, and that GULAG inmates and communal apartment dwellers
in particular were likely to denounce their fellows, putting self-interest before ideological
considerations.41 By  implication,  truly  reliable  evidence  would come from those  who
subscribed to the official  ideology.  However,  this aspect of punitive policy was never
explicitly discussed in judicial reports, and severe punishment for counter-revolutionary
agitation, practiced during the war, testifies that legal organs believed surgery to be the
most efficient kind of social prophylaxis.
33 How  effective  was  the  legal  repression  of  counter-revolutionary  agitation  in  raising
popular support of Stalin’s regime? Conversely, how can we assess the upsurge in the
incidence of “counter-revolutionary” speech in the first years of the war? It would be
easy to assume that at this time, marked by a series of dramatic losses, many people
reassessed  their  loyalty  to  the  Soviet  state  and  became  more  critical  of  official
propaganda.  This  was  certainly  the  case,  but  it  is  not  the  whole  picture.  For  every
reported case of counter-revolutionary agitation there were a few witnesses willing to
testify in court for the prosecution. Moreover, the majority of these cases, as the Supreme
Court’s report admits, were based on voluntary denunciations.42 In other words, whereas
many  Soviet  citizens  expressed  criticism  of  the  regime,  still  more  considered  such
criticism illegal and felt obliged to report on it to the authorities and provide testimony
that would ensure severe punishment of the culprits. It is ultimately irrelevant whether
all denunciations came out of ideological conviction. Much more important is that, by
participating  in  the  implementation of  official  judicial  policy,  and by  witnessing the
persecution of individuals who transgressed the law, Soviet citizens had an opportunity
to learn what  kinds of  views were considered “counter-revolutionary” and therefore
ought not to be expressed, at least in public. As the proportion of counter-revolutionary
crime tried in courts was increasing, so was growing the educative significance of Article
58.10.
34 Did the accessibility of this message affect actual popular opinion? The Supreme Court’s
report  acknowledges  that  the  wave  of  “counter-revolutionary”  speech  subsided only
when the situation on the front changed in favor of the Red Army.43 Undoubtedly, the
eventual Soviet victory did much more to restore the population’s loyalty to the regime
than any  policy  consciously  applied  to  this  end.  However,  by  analyzing  the  logic  of
judiciary prosecution of counter-revolutionary agitation, we can better understand not
only the factors that determined the fate of many victims of political repression, but also
the nature of the Soviet regime at the time. From judicial sources, this regime appears
extremely interventionist, not willing to let a single individual’s behavior out of its grasp,
and also one with few scruples about inflicting severe punishments. As the result of the
redefinition  of  subjective  culpability,  expressed  in  the  Supreme  Court’s  instructions,
more,  not  fewer  people  could  be  brought  to  court  for  politically  unacceptable
expressions.  Therefore,  the  changes  in  legal  politics  that  became  a  reaction  to  the
increase of counter-revolutionary agitation cases in the first years of the war can hardly
be termed as a liberalization.  Yet,  the regime,  as it  manifested itself  through its  law
enforcement system, also appears surprisingly modest and conservative in its ambitions
of transforming the population’s consciousness. On the individual level outward actions,
not private thoughts remained the scope of the court’s objectives. On the social level, it
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was traditional hierarchies the courts sought to preserve, not to radically reshape society.
Somewhat paradoxically, both these aspects – interventionism and conservatism – were
amplified after 1941.
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ABSTRACTS
Abstract
This article examines the politics of legal prosecution of politically subversive speech qualified as
“counterrevolutionary  propaganda  and  agitation”  according  to  Article  58.10  of  the  Soviet
Criminal Code in 1941-1942. These years saw a marked rise in the number of trials under this
article,  which  reflected  negative  popular  opinion  about  the  initial  Soviet  war  losses.  The
increased severity of punishment was dictated by fears of a popular uprising. At the same time,
the  supreme  judicial  organs  were  aware  that  the  excessive  punishment  of  civilians  might
undermine the morale of Red Army soldiers,  most of whom had families on the home front.
Soviet courts, therefore, had to strike an uneasy balance between ensuring state security and
preserving  the  loyalty  of  the  population.  To  do  so,  the  Supreme  Court  provided  detailed
instructions  that  admonished  lower  courts  to  assess  the  crime  in  view  of  its  social  danger,
determined by the “personality” of the accused rather than the nature of the offense. However,
the article argues, this emphasis on “personality” should not be interpreted as an attempt to
reshape  society  in  a  radical  way.  In  fact,  the  main  objective  of  the  legal  repression  of
“counterrevolutionary agitation” was to preserve the status quo in the relationship between the
Soviet  population  and  Stalin’s  regime.  The  courts  were  advised  to  consider  the  culprit’s
personality  in  terms of  age,  gender,  and class,  which affirmed traditional  social  hierarchies.
Transforming the population’s consciousness was not a priority for the judicial system, and it
contributed to this transformation only indirectly, by involving broader population in trials as
witnesses and audience.
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Résumé
Cet article examine la politique des poursuites judiciaires engagées en 1941-1942 dans le but de
sanctionner les propos politiquement subversifs qualifiés de « propagande et d’agitation contre-
révolutionnaire »  par  l’article  58.10  du  code  pénal  soviétique.  Ces  années  ont  vu  une
augmentation significative du nombre des procès relevant de cet article, ce qui témoigne d’une
opinion populaire négative sur les premières pertes de guerre soviétiques. La sévérité accrue des
peines était dictée par la peur d’un soulèvement populaire. Parallèlement, les organes judiciaires
suprêmes étaient conscients que l’application excessive de peines à l’encontre des civils pouvait
saper le moral des soldats de l’Armée rouge dont la plupart avaient leur famille à l’arrière. Dès
lors, les cours de justice soviétiques durent man œuvrer délicatement afin d’assurer la sécurité
de l’État tout en conservant la loyauté de la population. Pour ce faire, la Cour suprême fournit
des instructions détaillées aux cours basses, les exhortant à juger les crimes, moins en fonction
de la nature de l’offense qu’en fonction de leur danger social, déterminé par la « personnalité »
de l’accusé. Cependant, l’auteur précise que cet accent mis sur la personnalité ne saurait être
interprété comme une tentative de refonte radicale de la société. De fait, l’objectif principal de la
répression judiciaire de l’« agitation contre-révolutionnaire » était de maintenir le statu quo dans
les relations entre la population soviétique et le régime stalinien. Il fut recommandé aux cours de
prendre en considération la personnalité de l’inculpé en termes d’âge, de genre et de classe pour
assurer le maintien des hiérarchies sociales traditionnelles. Le système judiciaire n’avait pas pour
priorité de transformer la conscience du peuple, il  n’y a contribué que de façon indirecte en
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